Carol Malouf KhattabOn March 27th, 2025, Lebanese Defence Minister Michel Menassa and his Syrian counterpart, Mourhaf Abou Qasra signed a security agreement in Jeddah. The accord to enhance border coordination and address military threats came after deadly border clashes that left 10 people dead.
The officials gathered in Jeddah under the sponsorship of Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman to sign a long-awaited border demarcation agreement, marking what may be a turning point in the complicated history of relations between the two neighbours.
The deal includes plans for legal committees and joint mechanisms to improve security and stability along their shared border. Border tensions flared earlier in March after Syria’s new authorities accused the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah of abducting three soldiers into Lebanon and killing them.
For decades, the absence of a clearly defined border has enabled smuggling, empowered armed groups, and allowed Syria to maintain a grip on Lebanese politics.
Though Syrian troops officially withdrew in 2005 following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri—a murder widely attributed to Damascus—Syria never entirely relinquished control. It continued to exercise influence through political proxies, intelligence networks, and economic levers.
Syria entered Lebanon in 1976 during the civil war and solidified its presence through the 1989 Taif Agreement. For nearly 15 years, over 14,000 Syrian troops and intelligence agents occupied Lebanon under Assad’s regime.
For much of modern history, Lebanon’s relationship with Syria has been characterised by domination. The Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council (SLHC) institutionalised power imbalance, while critics of Syria were met with exile, marginalisation, or assassination.
Formed in 1991, under the so-called “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination,” the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council was presented as a framework to formalise relations between two neighboring states emerging from war.
Tehran’s quest for regional dominance crumbles as military misadventures and internal failures end grand dreams of reviving the Persian empire.
Key decisions—ranging from security appointments to economic policies —were no longer the sole prerogative of the Lebanese state, but subject to “consultation,” often meaning pre-approval from Damascus. Far from a bilateral partnership, the council became a mechanism of control, ensuring that Lebanon’s post-war political order served Syrian interests first.
Despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, Damascus’s influence persisted—primarily through the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, which filled the power vacuum, maintaining Syria’s grip over Lebanon through its military presence and political influence.
Now, with the fall of Bashar al Assad in late 2024 and a new government in place in Damascus, some hope that ties can be rebuilt on mutual respect, on the basis of state-to-state diplomacy, rather than coercion.
Any genuine shift in relations will require Lebanon to dismantle the remnants of Syrian control, beginning with the abolition of the SLHC and ensure that future relations with Syria are based on diplomacy—not backdoor deals and foreign influence.
A key step toward ending Syrian influence is dealing with the Ba’ath Party in Lebanon. For decades, it claimed to be an independent political party, but in reality, it was just an extension of the Syrian regime, used to manipulate Lebanon’s internal affairs.
Following the fall of Bashar al Assad on December 8, 2024, Syria’s new transitional government moved quickly to dissolve the Ba’ath Party on January 29, 2025. The ban was officially declared under Syria’s new interim constitution, signed by President Ahmed al Sharaa on March 13, 2025.
If Syria itself has outlawed the Ba’ath Party, Lebanon must follow suit. The party should be banned from Lebanese politics, and its members should be prevented from running in elections under new names. The days of Syrian-backed parties controlling Lebanon must end.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stresses that the prosperity of Lebanon and Syria is necessary for regional stability.
Different Damascus?
For the past three months, Syria’s new leadership has shown genuine goodwill toward Lebanon. Unlike the old regime, which saw Lebanon as a province of Greater Syria, the new government has taken steps to prove it respects Lebanese sovereignty.
One major move has been the Syrian army’s crackdown on drug smuggling across the Lebanese border—especially in areas controlled by Hezbollah and allied tribes. Syria’s military shut down drug manufacturing sites and smuggling routes that had long been protected by powerful militias. This is a clear departure from Assad’s Syria, which actively supported drug smuggling to fund its war efforts and maintain influence in Lebanon.
Damascus has made it clear that it does not want to engage in conflict with the Lebanese army but expects Lebanon to take full responsibility for securing its borders. These actions have sent positive signals to Lebanese leaders, showing that Syria’s new government is not looking to interfere in Lebanese politics, unlike its predecessor.
The border agreement, if it is to hold, must be more than symbolic. Years of porous boundaries have allowed the trafficking of fuel, arms, and narcotics to flourish.
Joint security patrols between the Lebanese and Syrian armies could help stem the flow and restore some measure of law and order. This is crucial not only for security but also for Lebanon’s struggling economy, which has been severely impacted by the black-market trade in fuel, food, and illicit drugs.
From the pager and walkie-talkie attacks to the killing of Nasrallah and Safieddine, events of last year were beyond humiliating for Hezbollah and its supporters in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Shebaa Farms and Hezbollah’s rationale
One particularly thorny and unresolved issue is the Shebaa Farms, a contested strip of land occupied by Israel but claimed by both Lebanon and Syria.
For years, Hezbollah has used the uncertainty over Shebaa Farms as an excuse to justify its military presence, claiming that armed resistance is necessary to liberate Lebanese territory. However, if the border demarcation agreement clarifies whether Shebaa belongs to Lebanon or Syria, then Hezbollah’s justification for keeping its weapons will disappear.
Lebanon must ensure that only the Lebanese Army is responsible for defending the country, not an independent militia acting on behalf of foreign powers. Resolving the Shebaa issue will be a major step toward ending Hezbollah’s dominance over Lebanon’s security decisions.
Finalising Lebanon’s border with Israel
Beyond Syria, Lebanon’s southern border with Israel remains unresolved. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, Lebanon is expected to finalise its boundary with Israel— a step that would eliminate yet another excuse Hezbollah uses to justify its armed presence.
Should Lebanon define its borders on all sides, the logic for any armed non-state actor would collapse. The Lebanese Army must be bolstered to take full control of the nation’s borders, as befits a sovereign state.
The new Syrian government, emerging from years of war, now has a chance to redefine its relationship with Lebanon. If Syria truly wants to rebuild and regain legitimacy, it must show that it is no longer the bully of the past.
That means honouring the border agreement, refraining from political meddling, and severing ties with destabilising actors.
For decades, Lebanon has suffered from Syrian interference, Israeli occupation, and Iranian-backed militias. This border agreement presents an opportunity to finally establish sovereignty, but only if Lebanon’s leaders have the political will to enforce it.
The question remains: Will they seize this moment, or will Lebanon continue to be a battlefield for regional power struggles?
